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Climate change is a phenomenon which, however hypothetical it may be, is 
characteristic of the global nature of environmental problems. At its most 
general, it is also a phenomenon characteristic of a threatened society, 
since this phenomenon is not directly observable and is only accessible, in 
al1 probability, via an immense scientific, technical and institutional 
network. 
For public opinion and the sociopolitical system, climate change risk is 
thus only conceivable and recognizable if deliberate action is taken in order 
to inform the public and the decision-makers. We will focus here primanly 
on the agents who can ensure mediation to the general public, namely 
journalists, and we will examine their relationship with their two principal 
sources of information, namely scientists and experts on the one hand, and 
environmental associations on the other hand. 
From a theoretical point of view, this analysis clearly centres on the 
perspective established by Schlesinger (1992) for whom media sociology 
must abandon its exclusive orientation towards processing information and 
the content of messages, in short its media-centric orientation, in order to 
open itself up in an analysis of the field of information. This analysis 
emphasizes the strategies of actors towards the media and agents who may 
serve as journalists' sources. We believe this perspective has priority in 
questions of the global environment because, in fact, it deals with 
questions on which, a priori, readers or consumers have no information of 
their own; also such questions or public events are mainly, if not 
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exclusively, produced for puhlic opinion in order to direct its perceptions 
and actions. 
We helieve that our analysis is able to clarify the following questions. 
Firstly, people may wonder under what conditions the media uncover a 
particular prohlem and deal with it in a mediatic manner: are these 
conditions accessible to journalists or other actors? Are we dealing with 
conditions particular to the media or  do they refer more broadly to the 
sociopolitical context? This question inevitahly leads us to the hehaviour of 
source-actors, scientists in particular: why and how do they intervene in 
this mediatization? Are they competitors or  partners working in associ- 
ation? Finally, we will ask what may he the impact of a media sociology 
once it has hecome widely diffused and when certain of its topics are well 
known in expert circles. 
Methodology 
This analysis relies on companng the process of mediatization in three 
neighhouring countries of the European Community: Belgium, France and 
Germany. In 1992, a group of scientists, journalists and heads of environ- 
mental protection associations were questioned. The interviews centred on 
their rnutual relationships and on the political and mediatic treatment of 
the question. This comparison is enlightening because we are dealing with 
three very different situations from several points of view. Germany is a 
pioneer in climate research whereas France, although having reputed 
researchers in certain domains, lags slightly behind; as for Belgium, it is 
too small to develop an actual research programme but several research 
centres have been well integrated into the international network. Belgium 
and Germany have strong environmental associations which are active in 
political life, and recognized environmental associations that deal with 
- 
climate change. However, France has a weaker environmentalist move- 
ment, particularly directed towards questions of planning and nature, with 
a very poor presence among international associations. Thus, we must 
consider three different contexts, both from the points of view of the 
scientific as well as of the political fields. 
But how do these different contexts model the mediatic treatment of the 
question? What mechanisms take account of these differences and are 
these mechanisms linked to actors' explicit strategies? 
Empirical findings 
We will limit ourselves here to the main empirical findings of Our research 
by first examining the role of scientific experts in the process of puhlicizing 
climate change. 
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Scientific experts and climate change 
The main questions posed to the experts interviewed were clear and 
simple: what do  you think should he said to public opinion about the 
greenhouse effect? What do you think should he done about this risk - 
that is to Say what measures would you suggest? Three very different 
models of media representation emerge from their replies. 
Spontaneous sociologies of opinion and of the media. The first model - 
mainly found among French experts - is defined as a theatrical model: 
overall it is a model of media disqualification, in which the media are 
considered incompetent to transmit correct information about the green- 
house effect. It may he summarized hy the following characteristics: 
media information is subject to the effect of fashion, even that of the 
masses; 
the media are incapable of transmitting complex information about a 
prohlem which requires profound research; 
the media are dominated hy the irrational: what takes precedence is the 
event, the mediatic reputation of the personalities to whom one is 
speaking; 
public demands are childish, they are concerned with emotion, with 
setting up conflict scenanos hetween opposing parties rather than with 
thorough research. 
In contrast, in Germauy, despite individual differences, another model 
prevails which may he termed a public communication model: 
the media form a structured space: we distinguish here media which are 
more concerned about the environment than others, and above al1 we 
distinguish, for example, newspapers that serve as points of reference (at 
the level providing reliable information) and those that may bring about 
opinion changes; 
irrationality is a normal component of mediatic information that can 
only communicate simple and comprehensive things to the general 
public; 
* puhlic concern - the emotional factor - is considered normal and 
justified because attacks on the environment are seriow and affect 
ordinary people. 
A third model may be described as an intermediary model. It characterizes 
the media as follows: 
the media are hlamed less for dramatizing the question than for 
introducing confusion: they combine the climate issue with that of 
demography, the Third World and other environmental prohlems; 
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s as for the public, its appetite is aroused: reacting emotionally, the public 
asks for simple and quick solutions, it wants to move faster than science, 
and that produces uncontrolled effects, mainly certain experts' spectacu- 
lar interventions without control by other scientists. 
It is remarkable that in these three models we in fact encounter the same 
communication difficulties via the media, particularly the emotional factor. 
This is therefore a common image that underlies these three models, one 
that falls within the domain of what may be termed a spontaneous media 
sociology. What seems to be crucial is whether ultimately a positive or, on 
the contrary, a negative vision of the media is taken. And the real 
difference lies in the implicit status that is given to public opinion in the 
political handling of the greenhouse effect. 
For scientists in Germany, and often also in Belgium, public opinion 
constitutes a compulsory route, whereas most French scientists instead 
consider the risks and dangers of giving a public airing to the question of 
the greenhouse effect. 
For most German scientists, the crucial locus of discussion is the political 
scene because as political decisions that can require mass pressure are 
essential, it is such pressure that ensures that efficient laws are introduced. 
From this angle, the media play an important role and scientific experts 
must adopt an active approach towards public opinion because they are 
responsible for the quality of the public debate: considering that politi- 
cians' credibility is often poor, it is up to scientists to 'mark out the debate' 
and to indicate the real risks and responsibilities to take. The 'public 
communication' model is thus a model that places the political debate and 
political decisions at the centre of the question. 
In contrast, the 'theatrical' model disqualifies not only the media, but 
also political debate: it relies in fact on a perception according to which 
political debate is useless because politicians are incapable of making 
decisions fraught with consequences because they might weigh heavily 
upon lifestyles and consumption levels. It is thus a pessimistic model of 
public action. Furthermore, in this representation, science is essential 
because solutions will emerge from research and from scientific thought. 
Finally, scieniists have more to lose than gain in a mediatization or a 
politicizition of the question: they risk their credibility because the media 
transform hypotheses into 'catastrophic scenarios', into readymade solu- 
tions and schemes that will discredit researchers and divide them. 
Finally, in the third model, we insist above al1 on the necessary 
separation of the public scene (media and politics) from the scientific 
scene: the media and politics take on the discussion of political choices and 
values, whereas scientists define risks and counter-measures. Above al1 
scientists must retain mastery of what is communicable and thus avoid the 
suggestion or  adoption of decisions which would cause additional risks. We 
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emphasize here the risks of a hasty political decision while uncertainty still 
weighs heavily on the rhythm and impact of climate change and thus on 
what preventive measures should be taken. 
Therefore these three models are not only different ways of conceiving 
the media, but also ways of thinking about public debate on the question of 
the greenhouse effect and scientists' roles in this. In fact the public 
communication model, ahove al1 the one found in Germany, implies a 
definition of the problem that considers climate change as ineluctable if 
measures are not taken, that considers the social effects of climate change 
(in particular for the Third World, with repercussions on developing 
countries) to be such that only prevention is a reasonable strategy. 
Supporters of the theatrical model also consider that climate change will 
occur, but they predict tbat it is inevitable because they do not believe that 
preventive measures are politically feasible; they also believe that more 
serious upheavals than climate change are underway (mainly a demo- 
graphic explosion) and that only scientific research will be able to provide 
long-term solutions. Finally, the intermediary model relies on reasoning 
that favours uncertainty: considering climate change as still relatively 
unforeseeable, mainly in its consequences, it highlights the economic and 
social risks of weighty decisions in a context of poor knowledge. Thus, it 
advances the necessity for a political debate but seeks to preserve the 
search for a climate of engaged discussion on these decisions. Conse- 
quently, in this interpretation, on the basis of a consensus of experts owe 
would he faced with different perceptions of the nsk of climatic change. 
But this interpretation shows that the evaluation of risk takes place 
according to the evaluation of associated risks: risks linked to other 
'catastrophic' developments or  risks caused by political decisions to 
prevent the greenhouse effect, or  even secondary risks resulting from 
climatic change, for example such as migratory movements €rom the Third 
World to developed countnes. In other words, and this is Our fundamental 
hypothesis, it is by means of diverse expectations concerning the social 
world that the evaluation of risk takes place. 
The scientific and mediaticfields. The relationships between a specialized 
scientific domain and the media are the product of the structuring of the 
scientific field as well as that of the journalistic field. 
A certain number of general stmctural factors inevitably intervene. 
Thus, the German press is diversified, with multiple regional daily papers 
and regional television stations, whereas the French press is more central- 
ized with a few large intellectual daily papers and a more popular regional 
press. On the other hand French intellectuals, above al1 scientists, 
intemene less in the press and the public debate than in Germany, mainly 
because journalists have been defined historically as opposed to intellec- 
tuals. 
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As regards our climate change question, it is necessary to add that on the 
scientific side, this domain of research is not as organized in France as in 
Germany: while over several years Germany has developed a climate 
research programme and constructed a network of research centres, 
France - and Belgium even more so - is characterized instead by the 
existence of various research centres, occasionally competitive, and which, 
at the time of the survey, did not co-operate closely nor distribute tasks. 
The scientific field's degree of organization conditions access to the media: 
if it is poor, it is not only more difficult to identify competent researchers, 
but the latter also do not have a commonly held opinion; and there is real 
self-censorship inside the scientific environment of a researcher who, to 
appeal to the media, must inevitably set aside his specialized competence 
in order to give a general overview of the problem, specify the risks, even 
indicate the measures to be taken. 
The case of Germany indicates, on the contrary, that strong organization 
of the field enables a network and a common framework of opinion to be 
established, allowing the media to identify relevant speakers. Furthermore 
it has become necessary, at least in the main German research centre in 
Hamburg, to appoint a young researcher to ensure smooth relationships 
with the press and associations. It is less a question of public relations in 
this case than of installing an authorized contact to whom journalists and 
activists may apply, have their articles checked, and inform themselves of 
the bearing of any scientific or political event connected with the green- 
Iiouse effect. 
Moreover it is evident that the German press has numerous journalists 
specializing in the environment and that television has a specific service 
and offers regular broadcasts in this domain whereas no television station, 
not even the public networks in France or  in Belgium, has yet succeeded in 
creaiing a regular magazine programme on environmental problems. 
These problems are occasionally mentioned in broadcasts dedicated to 
nature, tourism, consumption or  sometimes political events. 
Thus there is striking conformity between the spontaneous media 
sociology shared by French scientists and the relationships between their 
research field and the press, as there is between the 'public communication 
model' that is shared by German researchers and the organized nature of 
their actions towards journalists. The implicit model that researchers have 
of the media and of communication, if it is indeed produced by this set of 
relations, has every chance of reinforcing them: this is well illustrated in 
France where researchers keep out of the way of the media, refuse to enter 
certain debates and leave the way clear for popularizers (such as Haroun 
Tazieff or Jacques Cousteau). 
Nevertheless, the case of Belgium, where the scientific field is not vesy 
organized, less so even than in France, and where the general media give 
even less attention to this question, indicates tbat there are other means of 
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communicating with the public. The Belgian researchers questioned 
tended to accept the 'public communication' model more than the 
'theatrical' model so prevalent in France. If they do not have an organized 
strategy towards the media, it is because they rely much more on the 
support they themselves provide, most often by personal commitment, to 
associations that develop strategies towards public opinion and the press. 
Comparing these three cases thus enables the following hypothesis to be 
formulated: the representation that scientists have of the media may be 
partly explained hy the state of objective relationships of their scientific 
field and that of the press; but this representation, which tends to reinforce 
this state of things since it induces strategies on the part of scientists, must 
also be understood by reference to the model that scientists hold of the 
public domain. 
The structuring of the debate in the political field. It is not only the 
relationship between journalists and the media which differentiates these 
three countries: it is also the manner in which experts are used in public 
consultation. In a nutshell, it can be said that in Germany an expert public 
discussion on climate change has been organized through a Bundestag 
committee, whereas in France two relatively confidential reports, one from 
the Academy of Sciences, the other from an interdepartmental group of 
senior officiais, have been the basis of scientific and political evaluation. 
Finally, in Belgium, the political debate has taken place between representa- 
tives of large interest groups (employers, trade unions, fasmers, ecological 
organizations) and has ahove al1 concemed Belgium's immediate political 
commitments, in practice excluding scientific expertise from the discussion. 
In conclusion, it is thus possible to broaden our hypothesis by assuming 
that scientists' relationships to the media in fact fit in like a prop on a stage 
or in a public arena. The representations that scientists have of the media 
derive from the structural state of relationships between scientists and 
journalists; by inducing behaviour which is sometimes that of withdrawal, 
sometimes that of commitment, such representations confirm and reinforce 
the configuration of relationships from which they originate. They are 
neither true nor false, they simply reflect a reality on which they act as 'self- 
fulfilling prophecies'. Thus we may wonder what are the factors producing 
change, how a move occurs from one configuration to another. And it 
seems to us that this is where environmental associations intervene. 
The function and strategies of associations 
Some researchers have afready discussed the role of associations as 
experts. And the case of climate change is typical since certain associ- 
ations, and in particular Greenpeace, have played a significant role in 
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formulating the problem: Greenpeace has published a scientific report on 
the question that researchers (who knew about it) considered a serious 
piece of work. Greenpeace's expert on this issue is a well-known former 
scientist. 
Yet we believe that this is not the associations' main role, even if they 
do play a genuinely expert role. Inevitably associations also play an 
important role in the diffusion of information on climate change. Yet, even 
in Germany, it is rather press initiatives (mainly by Der Spiegel) whith 
have genuinely populanzed the question. Associations in fact have their 
own press and publics but for them to broaden their audience on a question 
they almost always require access to the media, and this is normally 
achieved by organizing more or  less spectacular events (counter-expert 
conferences, boycotts, demonstrations, etc.) which may arouse journalists' 
interest. Nevertheless, the associations' role seems to us, from our 
interviews, to be much deeper and more subtle than that of experts, 
hecause they intervene as mediators hetween public opinion and scientific 
expertise. 
Providing a credibility test. The first, if not the most visible, of the 
associations' functions focuses on the credibility of the diagnosis suggested 
by scientists. In this way they answer the lay person's implicit question, 
which is knowing what value experts' discourse may have, and who may 
judge the intrinsic value of research. 
Associations may test the credibility of researchers in several ways. 
m On the one hand, they may organize second (expert) conferences by 
mobilizing differing opinions among scientists and presenting these to 
the public and thus the media. Such conferences are typically organized 
alongside certain international summits. 
0 On the other hand, they seek to reveal researchers' implicit commit- 
ments in the formulation of their diagnosis: via events such as confer- 
ences, via interviews or  by giving space to researchers in their own press, 
they show that certain scientists are detiberately engaged in the environ- 
mentalist cause and that this gives their views added value; on the other 
hand, they may also, but less puhlicly, reveal certain researchers' 
commitments, for example their closeness to certain pressure groups, for 
instance the nuclear industry. 
Associations intervene ultimately as protagonists in the communication 
of science to the public. In the press, science is often presented via 
popular columns which show little concern for the impact of the 
techniques described, or  even via events and discoveries which are 
blown out of al1 proportion. The associations' role is thus to provide 
additional information for the environmental debate, or even to relati- 
vize information by appealing to other scientists to take a stand on a 
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given issue. In the same way, they also serve as a communication link 
between scientific disciplines. 
Associations may also influence this evaluation of the credibility of 
researchers by acting as intermediaries between the press and the world of 
research: often associations take advantage of more spheres of expertise 
than most journalists and often it is the leaders of such groups who indicate 
to journalists who the relevant speakers are. 
Tire n>lr ofrisk inrerprcrarion. Thc second function of associations is widely 
shared with the mcdi;~, tind i t  is this which ofrcn ürouses most criticism and 
reservations on the part of scientists. We cal1 it risk interpretation because 
f o r  associations it deals with providing substance to scientific diaenoses 
- 
which are most often expressid in thé and form of figures, curves and 
diagrams. 
It is true that for journalists, the simplest and most spectacular 
interpretation consists of representations of catastrophe (as, for instance, 
by man-made images such as Cologne Cathedra1 under water). The 
associations' work on the contrary seeks to define the largest number of 
possible consequences that may have some significance for the different 
publics which it addresses: 
thus reference may be made to a hot, dry summer and to problems of 
water supply that are well known in a given region to make it understood 
that a few degrees rise in temperature would not be a minor problem; 
where naturalists are the target, the interpretation provided might bring 
out the impact of changes upon fauna and flora; 
economic changes might also be mentioned, showing the political risks 
that changes and movements in agricultural production would cause. 
Thus much more explicitly than scientists, and by often relying on 
researchers' findings, associations operate a type of futurology, occasion- 
ally a little catastrophist because the message presupposes an appeal to the 
emotions and to the preoccupations and daily experiences of ordinary 
people. 
But the role of translation does not stop there because associations also 
engage in information strategies by exposing the resistance of those who do 
not want preventive policies: thus they expose economic lobbies by 
presenting them as a conservative gerontocracy, just as they present 
preventive policies as technical innovations rather than as technical 
regressions. 
A mobilizing and imaginative role. Finally, undouhtedly the most import- 
ant and specific role of associations consists of mobilizing supporters, 
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whole populations, even the authorities concerning specific and concrete 
objectives. We are not talking here only of petitions addressed to decision- 
makers, or  public demonstrations which are direct strategies aimed at 
infuencing decisions. Above all, we are concemed with initiatives which 
endeavour to combine technological changes and lifestyles. 
Thus, German ecological organizations have developed a series of 
concrete plans which seek to show that individuals' daily lives may be 
improved while preserving the environment by using new techniques, new 
ways of managing resources: this is the meaning of creating 'local 
development centres' concerned with suggesting new ways of dealing 
effectively with housing, public transport and gardening. It is in the same 
spirit that a Belgian ecological organization has launched a campaign 
promoting fluo-compact lamps encouraging energy economy. 
One of the characteristics of these ecological practices is to try to 
associate wnsumers and citizens at the local level: most of these pro- 
grammes are offered to local organizations in order that they might support 
or implement the same recommendations and offer an example and an 
experience. Certain German ecological organizations have gone further by 
offering towns the chance to participate in projects which would aim both 
at encouraging resource economy and at supporting development projects 
for the inhabitants of Latin American forests. 
Even if the mediatic dimension is generally not very visible, the main 
îunction of such local action seems to constitute credibility tests for 
alternative technology and ways of life. These experiences render such 
changes of consumption styles imaginable and plausible. 
Furthermore these actions rely on and allow associations to develop 
their own expertise which is not actual scientific expertise, but technical 
and administrative expertise. One example is the comprehensive analysis, 
carried out by a Belgian organization, of al1 the surface treatment 
techniques of metals and their classification according to cost and polluting 
impact: such a tool enables suggestions to be made to industries about 
alternatives to the techniques they are using. It can finally be said that 
ecological associations intervene here as agents of innovation or  of 
diffusion of new technology. 
Ecological associations, whose scientific legitimacy is poor, therefore 
intervene in the expert process in a dual manner: 
on the one hand they intervene in public perception of the risk by 
mobilization of the public to introduce the climate question onto the 
political agenda; 
e on the other hand they intervene by stimulating changes in technologies 
and ways of life, thus contributing to rendering prevention strategies 
plausible. 
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Countervailing control of scient@c and political information 
Having identified the roles and strategies of the two major actors who act 
as sources for mediatization of climate change, we may ask ourselves about 
the relationships between these two sources and the media themselves. 
Firstly, one may characterize the interplay of relationships between 
these three actors as an interplay of competition and complementarity. As 
far as climate change is concerned, it is evident that scientists are the main 
information source and that journalists grant most credibility to this source 
when facts and predictions are to be presented. In controversial situations, 
journalists, by professional tradition, are anxious to present opposing 
arguments, which inevitably places them in potential conflict with certain 
scientists who reject such controversy and maintain that the scientific world 
is much more unanimous about the theory of climate change than 
journalists would hold. Concerned about balance, journalists tend to grant 
equivalent weight to both approaches. Thus it is evident that the degree of 
structuring of the scientific field (as in Germany) and of scientists' 
commitment to public debate is an important factor in stabilizing public 
opinion. In France, on the contrary, journalists tend to see themselves as 
intermediaries, people who are more political than scientific, because they 
are known and because public opinion clearly distinguishes the nature of 
the commitment of people like Cousteau or  Tazieff, who are clearly 
identified as environmental defenders. Thus we may conclude that the 
weight of the media and of journalists is relatively proportional to the weak 
commitment of scientists in publicizing environmental issues. 
Secondly, the interplay is equally ambiguous between associations and 
scientists: in Germany as in Belgium, scientists rely more or less explicitly 
on the media, even if a certain suspicion cornes over regarding their 
politicization of the debate: disagreement clearly lies in the fact that 
associations put forward more or less radical suggestions for action and 
decision that scientists do not want to take up and which they pass on to 
political decision-makers. This is even further accentuated in France where 
scientists insist on the danger of hasty decisions. But they al1 acknowledge 
that associations play a pedagogic role. 
Finally, there is competition and complementarity between media and 
associations. Complementarity because associations are often intermedi- 
aries between scientists and journalists (acting as primary sources), but 
competition because associations are capable of creating media events and 
also of managing information networks which are relevant to them. 
Our hypothesis is that this relationship of complementarity and competi- 
tion is inherent to the logic of relationships between the political, scientific 
and journalistic fields, but they can take on different configurations 
depending on the context. 
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Consequently, public presentation of these facts, in the press or in public 
communication, inevitably implies something other than a simple scientific 
popularization. It assumes a framing of the facts in relation to a series of 
socioeconomic, ethical or other parameters. The key question is thus who 
frames. 
This process of 'framing' facts is interactive, but the form of interaction 
varies from one context to another and grants the media a more or less 
important place in relation to other actors. It is possible thus to conclude 
that the public construction of the environment is only a purely mediatie 
process (that is to say one where journalists interpret scientific facts in their 
own language) if other actors intervene a little or not at all. 
2. But media sociology, because known to some extent3 in intellectual 
circles, may be reinterpreted4 by actors in the particular context of a 
problem. A sociology that analyses the media by bringing to the forefront 
the handling of environmental problems, in effect criticizes the inadequa- 
cies of journalistic work. This type of analysis undoubtedly has real 
theoretical value and relies on empirical data. However, as it centres 
mainly upon journalists and content, it undoubtedly tends to overvalue 
journalists' weight in the construction of news by ignoring the role of other 
actors or even accepting that the absence of other actors (scientists or 
associations) in itself constitutes a problem. These analyses thus risk 
reinforcing, at least in certain contexts, experts' spontaneous criticism of 
the press. For us what is important is that this spontaneous or scholarly 
media sociology comes to justify scientists' withdrawal of commitment 
from the public scene. And this withdrawal, typically noted among French 
experts, is pernicious because it acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy by leaving 
the media arena free of any control by scientists over public communica- 
tion. 
Accordingly, we would argue that media analysis should in future be 
developed on the basis of two postulates. The first is that true media 
analysis is that of the public arena, which includes public opinion but 
involves more than that, that is to say, it is the arena of different social 
positions on a problem. The second postulate is that this public arena must 
be analysed as an arena of competition between information producers and 
contexts of interpreting facts and events. There is no limiting case where 
the press alone constructs a problem because it always has recourse to 
several sources, points of reference and personalities who may legitimize 
its messages; nor is there a limiting case where actors could construct a 
problem without mediatization, because even powerful associations are 
driven to broaden their audience by access to the media. Most real 
situations are located between these two extremes and imply an analysis of 
the interactive process between sources. 
3. The role of public opinion and of the press constitutes another 
dimension of the construction of environmental problems that we have 
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hardly touched upon here. We might suppose that in Our societies the role 
of the press and journalists is not only to communicate information 
(coming from experts or authorities and directed towards the public) but 
also to 'represent' the public interest, that is to say to ask experts and the 
authorities questions that the public is asking. This press role has hardly 
been explored or studied. It makes us consider the press as a spokesperson 
for the public or various publics. It gives the joumalist the role of testing 
out the validity of frameworks of interpretation suggested by sources 
within the public. In the field that we have considered, this role is above al1 
filled by associations: these develop actions which seek to suggest theoreti- 
cal and practical responses to the greenhouse effect. In the process of 
constructing the problem, such action has a fundamental role, even for 
scientists: they enable possible or acceptable measures or more generally 
public 'sensihility' to be anticipated. They thus allow public decisions and 
the support that these decisions could obtain to be envisaged. In the press 
the feedback role of opinion is often reduced to opinion polling, whereas 
associations attempt in practice to reaiize concrete experiences which 
render change plausible and conceivable. 
Synthesis and conclusions 
The comparative analysis of the process of constructing an environmental 
problem in three national contexts has enabled it to be shown that in the 
case of climate change this process is an interactive one which, in very 
different configurations, obliges scientific experts, associations and jour- 
nalists to intervene. It is clear that other actors (especially industrialists) 
could also have been studied and that the real process is undoubtedly more 
complex. Nonetheless, the study illustrates that news construction is not 
linear, moving from scientific facts to public opinion. The construction of 
news involves the commitment of actors - mainly experts - and the 
development of a framework of reference. 
The role of the press, and this is the essential contribution of this 
research, is in fact a relative role. By granting priority to the analysis of 
source strategies, we reveal the real limits of media power. If the press has 
its own language, as do science or politics, the construction of the problem 
only seems to succeed on condition that relations between actors are 
established, each playing his role, and each exercising a certain control 
over communication. For media sociology, this conclusion is not without 
importance: it shifts the attention of the researcher from the media 
themselves to their specific role in the process of publicity. Finally 
attention needs to be drawn to the fact that a media sociology is not socially 
innocent: any sociology that overstates the role of the media may, for 
example, be reinterpreted hy certain actors who devalue them which, 
64 Media, Culture & Society 
ironically, tends t o  reinforce the  importance of the media but above all, 
maybe,  tends t o  prevent a reai process of public communication. 
Notes 
This article is based on research conducted in 1992 with the financial support of the 
French Ministries of the Environment and of Research and Technology under the 
ECLAT programme on the social and economic aspects of climate change. 
1. Public opinion, as measured by surveys, derives from the public's responses to 
the oravision of information and to the uositions taken hv different actors who have 
acccss ta the media, and to other souries of opinion formation. In this competitive 
interplay, information providers are at the same lime a source and producers of 
frameworks of reference (or of interpretations via normative and cognitive 
framcworks). On the notion of public opinion, cf. Bourdieu (1980). 
2. We may think that from the point of view of the media or jouriialists the 
distinction betwecn facts and hypotheses resulting from a predictive mode1 is 
prohably not pertinent: tlic readcr identifies scientific data as facts, whether it is a 
qticstion of verifiahle results or of less firmly supported data. 
3. We have reason to believe, but no empirical proof that, for example in 
France, several scicntists questioned had read the analysis that Duclos made of the 
media (Duclos, 1989) and that in Germany certain people had read other works, 
mainly Peltu (1985). 
4. In the proposed theoretical perspective, competition betwecn sources implies 
that cach actor has an idca of the role of the media, and it mainly implies that 
scientific experts (as intellcctual producers) consider media power tu be too 
important, or more precisely journalists' power over the media to be too important. 
This explains why most scientists insist on the fact that the media sliouid inform 
people better, and should popularize science better instead 01 dramatizing a few 
scientific facts. 
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